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Borderline personality disorder and the ethics of risk 
management:  The action/consequences model 
 
Abstract 
Patients with borderline personality disorder are frequent users of 
inpatient mental health units, with inpatient crisis intervention often 
used based on the risk of suicide.  However this can present an 
ethical dilemma for nursing and medical staff, with these clinician 
responses shifting between the moral principles of beneficence and 
non-maleficence, dependent on the outcomes of the actions of 
containing or tolerating risk.  This paper examines the use of crisis 
intervention through moral duties, intentions and consequences, 
culminating in an action/consequences model of risk management, 
used to explore potential outcomes.  This model may be useful in 
measuring adherence and violation of the principles of beneficence 
and non-maleficence, and therefore an aid to clinical decision making. 
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Introduction 
People with a diagnosis of borderline personality disorder (BPD) [1], 
also known as emotionally unstable personality disorder [2], are 
frequent users of mental health inpatient services [3].  These 
admissions can be both frequent and lengthy [4] and as such present 
many on-going challenges for clinicians from both nursing and 
medical professions.  The characteristics of BPD are detailed by NICE 
[3] as instability in interpersonal relationships, impulsive behaviour, 
fear of abandonment and rejection, unstable self-image and a 
tendency towards self-harm and suicidal thinking.  It is the potential 
for suicide completion which, understandably, acts as the primary 
reason for the intervention of mental health professionals.  Some 
studies have estimated a suicide completion rate of up to 10% in 
people with BPD [5], a heavy contribution to the anxieties provoked 
in clinicians involved in the assessment and management of risk.  
However, the purpose and consequences of intervention are often 
neglected in the arena of ethics.  This paper will look at the specific 
crisis intervention of acute mental health inpatient admission through 
discussion, and examine the core moral concepts of beneficence; to 
do good, and non-maleficence; to do no harm.  These are concepts 
which can sometimes be at odds in crisis management, with the 
tension in clinical judgement creating an ethical fray between the 
poles of containing and tolerating risk.  Moreover, there will also be 
an examination of the moral motivations behind risk specific 
measures, as duty to patients is weighed against clinician self-
preservation in the arena of accountability, public scrutiny and 
professional regulation.  Morality can be viewed as a triage of rules, 
motives and consequences, and all will be related to specific 
responses to patients with a diagnosis of BPD who may present to 
mental health services when in crisis.  This paper will conclude with 
the collation of issues into action/consequence model of BPD risk 
management, capturing the potential consequences of risk specific 
actions through a worked hypothetical example based on clinical 
experience. 
 
A crisis intervention is defined by Borshmann et al [6] as “an 
immediate response by one or more individuals to the acute distress 
experienced by another individual, which is designed to ensure safety 
and recovery and last no longer than one month”.  A common 
intervention to the acute distress of suicidal ideation is a crisis 
admission to an acute mental health ward, with an estimated 20% of 
mental health inpatients having a diagnosis of BPD [7].  These 
inpatient units are generally utilised with the aim of ensuring safety 
through containing risk.  Nursing staff are available for support and 
reassurance; however the purpose of admission is often to use the 
inpatient unit as a safe haven, and a base from which staff can 
provide risk specific measures such as constant observations.  
Constant observation prescribes one to one nursing for patients 
deemed to pose a significant risk to themselves or others [8] and, for 
people diagnosed with BPD, is primarily used as a safeguard against 
an imminent risk of serious self-harm or suicide. 
 
Containing Risk 
At first glance, any situation whereby a patient expresses thoughts 
and intent of suicide completion clearly warrants an intervention of 
this nature.  After all, nursing is the business of person-centred care 
and effective treatments, with safety prioritised through a policy of   
“no avoidable injury or harm” [9].  Beneficence would dictate nurses 
using all of their powers to maintain patient safety, with admission 
itself, and the on-going use of constant observations meeting these 
criteria.  A further intervention could be the use of nurses holding 
power, and any use of the Mental Health Care and Treatment 
(Scotland) Act 2015 [10].  The beneficence, the very obvious good, of 
these containing interventions is in a Kantian [11] and deontological 
duty of care to patient safety.   
 
The Maleficence of Containment 
Nevertheless the ethical subtleties of such situations, in the context 
of working with people diagnosed with BPD, require a deeper 
scrutiny.  Interventions may be both practical, and appear morally 
appropriate, yet still suffer unintended and sometimes negative 
consequences.  The Scottish Government [8] acknowledges that 
“containment felt by some patients under observation may lead to 
deterioration in their behaviour”.  Observation is undoubtedly an 
invasive process, where staff nurses may observe patients sleeping, 
eating, interacting with family members and in some cases using the 
bathroom.  Whilst this is all prescribed according to the level of 
perceived risk, it can understandably be frustrating to have personal 
space invaded, regardless of a clinician’s virtuous intentions, or sense 
of duty. 
 
Alternatively, yet still on an iatrogenic path, the level of patient 
frustration could shift to a detrimental level of reassurance 
experienced.  NICE [3] states, on crisis interventions, that “the 
assessing clinician should consider that such a response might 
inadvertently increase the risk in the longer term by decreasing the 
patient’s capacity to manage their own risk”.  Exploring the principle 
of non-maleficence, admission and constant observations can violate 
this, unintentionally disabling the patient by reinforcing their belief 
that they cannot keep themselves safe.  In this way, health services 
can directly mirror the patients’ anxiety, and respond with panic over 
any perceived risk of harm.  Furthermore, maleficent consequences 
swell if containment is over a prolonged timescale, with long 
admissions increasing the patient’s dependency.  Any benefits of 
containment could be said to be tenuous, with the potential for such 
iatrogenic harm. 
 
Coercive bondage is a term used by Hendin [12] which describes the 
transfer of the patients responsibility for their own personal safety to 
the clinician.  In measures such as inpatient admission and constant 
observation, this transfer is acutely experienced by both parties.  
Having this process formalised through risk specific interventions 
emphasises the patient’s helplessness and the clinician’s role as 
‘saviour’.  A challenge then comes, post crisis, in returning personal 
responsibility and autonomy to the patient.  This is a factor which has 
the potential to influence lengthy admissions.   
 
Moreover, the sense of security provided by nursing staff can 
reassure the patient through crisis, until the moment where 
intervention ends, and discharge is mentioned.  The patient can then 
experience fresh crisis at the prospect of a perceived abandonment.  
This can see a counterproductive cycle of crisis which negates any 
beneficent intentioned and fruitful purpose for hospitalization.  The 
patient can misunderstand the motives of clinicians, perhaps viewing 
discharge as an uncaring gesture, and can paradoxically become 
worse in hospital.  Furthermore, due to this fear of perceived 
abandonment in many patients with BPD, the longer an admission 
goes on, the stronger the association becomes between the 
apprehension around discharge and the acute distress experienced.   
 
At this point the clarity of the virtues, duty and intended beneficence 
of the initial risk management strategy is clouded by ethical 
ramifications which would haunt consequentialist thinking.  Although 
the aim may have been to help the patient, the consequences can be 
the reverse.  The patient may be ‘safe’, though they would not be 
considered ‘well’. 
 
Tolerating Risk 
Containing risk seems, certainly initially, to be the only course of 
action for managing suicidal ideation in patients with BPD which ties 
in with the deep caring philosophy of nursing.  Therefore it can be 
difficult for the layman to grasp why clinicians would ever tolerate 
any element of risk, particularly when it comes to the intimidating 
task of assessing the risk of suicide.  However, whereas containing 
risk is no doubt beneficent in terms of its virtue and duty based 
motivation to maintain safety, interventions of this nature can lead, 
regardless of intention, to the consequential maleficence discussed.  
As we develop our understanding of BPD, we so too develop an 
awareness of the harm that crisis intervention can bring, and can now 
begin to consider a ‘less is more’ approach.   
 
First and foremost given the potential for iatrogenic harm, tolerating 
risk can have beneficent outcomes, specifically the least restrictive 
care and the avoidance of unnecessary containment.  Surprisingly 
given its frequent utilization, Paris [13] and Oldham [14] cite the 
alarming lack of evidence for hospital admission as a successful 
intervention in suicide prevention.  Moreover there are claims, 
beyond this paper’s ethical debate, that admission itself is neutral at 
best [15] potentially detrimental [13, 15, 16], with particular 
concerns over the iatrogenic harm of long admissions [17].  
Alarmingly, some staff nurses have described uncertainty as to the 
purpose of admissions which have lasted up to 4 years [18]. 
 
The term malignant regression [19] describes the circumstance in 
which a patient deteriorates and becomes more suicidal in hospital, a 
potential consequence to containing risk.  Given that some patients 
diagnosed with BPD can have difficulties in maintaining stable 
interpersonal relationships, a busy ward with up to twenty-eight 
patients alongside overlapping shift patterns of nurses and doctors, 
can be a medley of misunderstanding.  These misunderstandings (in 
particular the possible perception of abandonment at the end of crisis 
intervention) can be potential triggers to self-destructive behaviour; 
the use of hospitalization needs to be carefully considered, as it rests 
on an ethical tightrope. 
 
Constant observations in particular are a costly resource which not 
only infringes on the privacy of the patient, but as described, formally 
transfers the responsibility for personal safety from patient to 
clinician.  An interesting aside comes in discussing which clinician 
adopts this.  Although observations are an intervention led and 
delivered by nurses, they still tend to have much of their authority 
and decision making within the hands of medical staff.  Whilst a 
complex issue which cannot be done full justice here, it is worth 
considering whether or not this ‘pass the parcel’ transfer of 
responsibility, from patient to doctor via nurse, has an impact on the 
motives behind, and the delivery of care.  Although it could be 
strongly argued that decisions and responsibility should be shared, 
the virtues, duties and consequences behind a decision may be 
blurred if interventions are prescribed for a patient, delegated by a 
doctor, but facilitated by a nurse. 
 
Constant observation clearly highlights the shift in responsibility as a 
nurse literally watches a patient sleep, go to the bathroom and eat 
their meals.  The consequential maleficence of these interventions 
has a tandem association with the longevity of them.  If used on a 
short term basis the consequential beneficence can still be justified 
as, in the immediacy of crisis, they can save lives [15].  However 
long-term interventions, whether admissions or use of constant 
observations, are clear violations of non-maleficence.  If interventions 
become long-term, it could be argued that patients are being 
encouraged to depend on the healthcare system for their own safety, 
as they lose coping mechanisms and the ability to control any self-
destructive impulses.  It could also be argued that these measures 
respond only pragmatically to the behaviour, and not empathetically 
to the underlying distress.   
 
With a view to avoiding these damaging consequences, tolerating risk 
can be an example of clinicians motivated by beneficence.  If a 
patient can maintain their autonomy, the consequences of risk 
tolerance are beneficent.  Paris [12] states the paradox that to treat 
any chronic suicidal ideation in the patient with BPD effectively, the 
patient must have the option to die.  Whilst this may initially be a 
challenging idea, it can open the door to a patient developing their 
own coping mechanisms, and a truly patient led recovery. 
 
The Maleficence of Tolerating Risk 
However, tolerating risk is obviously not without the potential for 
negative outcomes.  The potential violation of non-maleficence comes 
in this tolerance cultivating a complacency which puts patients, in 
need of intervention, at risk.  In tolerating risk, teams must have an 
agreed threshold for how much they can reasonably allow.  A 
damaging potential could be a habitual complacency.  Whilst 
tolerating risk may have beneficent motives, if it becomes ritualistic 
habit and not a serious and unique test of judgement, then the 
maleficent consequences present through clinician complacency, and 
an increased risk to patients.   
 
Given the fragile nature of people diagnosed with BPD, particularly 
around interpreting the motives of others, tolerating risk can also fuel 
a patients feelings of low self-worth and self-loathing and see an 
increase in acts, or threat of self-harming and suicidal behaviour.  If a 
patient perceives that their pain is not being taken seriously, they 
may feel the need to provide a physical demonstration, and thus 
‘prove’ their distress.  This impulsiveness in the face of perceived 
rejection has to be viewed alongside the reason for assessment, 
without a clinician adopting responsibility.  Therapeutic relationships 
and an effort to thoroughly explore thoughts and feelings, as 
precursors to behaviour, should be essential practice.  This issue 
highlights the importance of explicit empathy, and clear 
communication of the intent behind clinical decisions.   
 
Fundamentally, clinicians must continue to assess each patient, and 
each presentation, as completely unique.  Anyone working with 
patients with BPD would benefit from an ability to tolerate risk, 
without this tolerance becoming neglect.  Whilst any assessment will 
prove challenging, an essential distinction in deciding between 
measures of containment and tolerance comes in differentiating 
between the acute and long term risks of suicide. 
 
Defining risk:  Acute vs Long term Risk 
A first step prior to using the action/consequences model of BPD risk 
management is to define the classification of risk.  Suicidal thoughts 
can be experienced by some people diagnosed with BPD, with these 
thoughts often a chronic and enduring feature of the disorder.  A 
distinction therefore must be made between the acute risk of suicide, 
and the long term risk which is one of the key features in the DSM’s 
[1] diagnostic criteria.  Bateman and Krawitz [15] describe a baseline 
suicidality with episodic acute suicidality.  The baseline represents the 
enduring long term risk, and calls for a different approach to any 
acute episode. 
 
Without an ability to tolerate long term risk, the health service would 
see every presenting patient with BPD admitted to an inpatient unit, 
placed on constant observations and detained under the mental 
health act… forever.  Now besides being obvious that ‘forever’ is not 
financially sustainable, the greater concern would be the detriment to 
the patient previously discussed.  NICE [3] support the importance of 
this distinction, stating “while risks to self and others must not be 
dismissed, it is also important to distinguish between long-term risks 
and acute ones. Failure to do so can lead to an exaggerated and 
inappropriate response to long-term risks”.  It does however have to 
be acknowledged that making this distinction may not be easy for any 
health professional, and particularly those faced with a patient they 
have met for the first time.  Therefore this distinction is best made 
within the context of knowing your patient, or having detailed notes 
and crisis plans readily available to assessing clinicians. 
 
Our ‘actions’ within the model, the acts of tolerating and containing 
risk, can be most appropriately applied to these two alternate 
scenarios, and uniquely relate to the principles of beneficence and 
non-maleficence dependant on whether the risk of suicide is acute or 
long term.  Whilst long-term risk needs to be tolerated to allow a 
patient to maintain personal responsibility, acute risks need to be 
thoroughly assessed and can merit containment.  If acute risk is to be 
tolerated, this would be appropriate only within the context of a 
thorough assessment, team consensus regarding diagnosis and an 
established pattern of behaviour [20].  Ultimately, tolerance of long 
term risk allows the patient to maintain autonomy and a sense of 
control over their own behaviours, while containment could cause 
lasting harm and foster dependency. 
 
Containing risk is appropriate in some situations of acute suicidality, 
particularly where toleration could lead to a neglect of imminent 
suicide risk.  Whilst hospitalization has no evidence base for its value 
in treating suicidality in BPD, there can be no doubt of its potential to 
save lives.  It is making the distinction between these two 
classifications of risk, and responding appropriately, which presents 
the on-going challenge for clinicians.  Creating a foundation for the 
use of the action/consequence model, any action of tolerance or 
containment must first define the risk as chronic or acute.  This 
challenge is made all the more difficult by the rules, regulations and 
reputation of the nursing and medical professions, in the context of 
increasingly scrutinising societal eyes. 
 
Public Perception and Professional Reputation 
Given that assessment of risk rests with the subjective view of the 
clinician, it is easy to understand why the paternalistic hindsight of 
outside parties can create an atmosphere of apprehension.  The 
clinicians concerns may not only involve the patient’s immediate 
safety and long-term outcomes, but the views of the said patient, 
public, media, regulatory and legal bodies.  Both the tolerance and 
containment of risk have been discussed with a view to the patients 
benefit, although there can be other motivations in play.  The 
pressure on clinicians can prompt decision making which goes beyond 
patient-centred morality, moving from doing the right thing, and into 
the territory of being seen to do the right thing.   
 
Defensive psychiatry is defined by Simon [21] as “any act or omission 
that is performed not for the benefit of the patient but to avoid 
malpractice liability or to provide a legal defence against a 
malpractice claim”.  Here any debate on beneficence and non-
maleficence takes a backseat to the motivation of clinicians, with 
crisis intervention sometimes indicating clinician helplessness [22].  
Fagin illustrates that “the fears of what might happen if these 
patients are not contained inevitably lead to admission” [23].  These 
fears are likely a double edged sword of worry, capturing a genuine 
anxiety around the patient’s safety along with a fear of resulting 
litigation were the patient to come to any harm.  If clinicians as moral 
agents decide the best course of action for a patients benefit, we can 
justify these actions (on a short or long term basis) through duty, 
intention or consequences.  However, should actions become focused 
on the clinician and the avoidance of malpractice claims, the duty to 
the patient will have become secondary to self-interest, leaving any 
intervention void of ethical merit.  Alarmingly, one study found up to 
85% of clinicians had at one time, based decisions on this sense of 
professional self-preservation [24]. 
 
This self-interest may also be fuelled by organisational and 
professional pressure which can further impact on decision-making.  
The NMC code states that nurses should “act with integrity and 
uphold the reputation of your profession at all times” [25].  The 
reputation of nursing as a whole can be affected by a public who 
perhaps do not understand the ethical difficulties explored in terms of 
assessing and managing risk.  To the layman, an obvious conclusion 
to draw from containing risk is that the staff involved are full of care 
and compassion, and deeply concerned by a patient’s safety.  The flip 
side to this coin is in a potential public perception of tolerating risk as 
neglect.  For people who do not understand the nature of BPD, and 
the value of the sometime appropriate ‘less is more’ approach, 
tolerating risk can seem misguided, uncaring and even immoral.  If 
we look at the moral debate of acts and omissions and adopt the view 
that letting someone die is in effect the same as killing them, 
clinicians failing to ‘act’ and contain the threat of suicide could be 
labelled with a damning moral judgement which could only wash off 
with mass public education and understanding. 
 
Regulatory bodies, despite their intentions or principles, may be 
swayed by public opinion and feel the teleological need to be seen to 
‘do something’ in cases where somebody may have come to harm.  
Knowing this ‘something’ can affect professional registration; it is 
easy to see why doctors and nurses could make a link between the 
risk of patient suicide and the subsequent risk to their professional 
career.  Despite the maleficence which can come from intervention, 
containment is the option which is simpler to understand in terms of 
its ‘visible caring’ and ‘quick and easy’ moral justification.  Therefore 
the nursing and medical professions need to be careful that they 
adequately support, and do not persecute, staff who may face these 
difficult decisions on a daily basis.  A ‘customer is always right’ 
approach to investigations by regulatory bodies will only serve to 
intimidate mental health staff into acting against their professional 
instincts [26].  The NHS Quality Strategy [9] emphasises that care 
should be safe, person centred and effective.  It could be argued that 
defensiveness sees an over-emphasis on ‘safe’, which could see staff 
rely too heavily on containment, to the detriment of ‘person centred’ 
care and ‘effective’ treatment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Action/Consequence model of BPD Risk Management 
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The following worked example, based on clinical experience, 
demonstrates the use of the model, with reference to a hypothetical 
patient.  The model is to be a guide and a capturing of issues to 
increase awareness, and promote a ‘bearing in mind’ to aid clinician 
decision making: 
Kiki is a 27 year old female with a diagnosis of BPD, currently 
experiencing suicidal ideation.  She is met by a clinician who faces 
the challenging task of assessing whether the suicidal thoughts pose 
an acute and imminent risk, or whether they are consistent long-term 
with her baseline chronic condition.  Based on this assessment, made 
within the context of knowing the patient or having detailed notes 
and crisis plans available, the clinician should be deciding on whether 
or not to contain, or tolerate risk.  During this process, the decision 
making is aided by reflecting on the potential benefits, and dangers of 
either course of action.  A potential benefit to Kiki having her risk 
contained is that she will be safe.  Whilst it can be agreed that she 
may not be ‘well’, this could be an intervention that could save her 
life.  The danger with containment is that Kiki could potentially 
become dependent, with crisis intervention emphasising her 
helplessness, and her feeling that she needs to rely on mental health 
services for her personal safety.   
 
Nevertheless, there is the possibility that the risk, if deemed chronic 
and enduring, could be tolerated.  The benefit to this is that Kiki 
maintains her autonomy.  Avoiding dependence can be achieved 
clinically by placing an emphasis on crisis planning, identifying Kiki’s 
patterns of behaviour, triggers, and early warning signs.  Moreover 
minimizing the effectiveness of mental health services in times of 
crisis is an important strategy [15].  This will encourage the 
development of Kiki’s individual coping mechanisms, rather than 
reinforce her belief that she needs professional intervention to keep 
herself safe.  Kiki may however, interpret any toleration of risk as 
neglect, and a discrediting of her distress.  She may choose to 
provide further demonstrations of her distress through self-harm, 
suicidal behaviour, or communicating her intentions to do so.  
Ultimately, the clinician should not take responsibility for Kiki’s 
behaviour, and the same principles should apply to the assessment 
process.  The true flip side to this tolerating coin comes in the 
potential of dangerous clinician complacency, which can be to miss 
the signs of acute as opposed to chronic distress.  For these reasons, 
every patient must be seen as unique, every presentation be seen as 
unique, and the model used to aid decision making rather than 
promoting one fixed approach which becomes habitual. 
 Once an intervention, or non-intervention, has been decided on, it is 
then useful to continue through the model looking at timescale.  This 
will not only be useful on initial assessment, but also to add clarity to 
the success of intervention if it becomes prolonged and benefit is in 
doubt.  Whilst Kiki could have her risk of suicide contained, it needs 
to be acknowledged by clinicians that this is likely to be a short term 
benefit only, and that the long-term implications is a delayed risk of 
dependency.  Therefore if admission/intervention moves from 24-72 
hours into a week or more, the model provides a framework from 
which potential iatrogenic harm can be highlighted.  It would be 
hoped that the model would emphasise maleficence, and justify a 
change of approach, long before Kiki’s length of admission moved 
from weeks to months to years. 
 
However, if Kiki’s clinician feels it is appropriate to tolerate suicidal 
ideation, assessing the risk as chronic rather than acute, the model 
could provide reassurance that whilst there is a risk taken, this risk is 
ultimately short-term.  Tolerating risk avoids the delayed risk of 
containment, promoting a beneficent patient empowerment and 
autonomy, rather than a maleficent dependency on services.  With 
Kiki having control over her own impulses, she would have an 
opportunity to re-establish coping mechanisms, or develop new ones. 
 
Finally, the model highlights how a clinician’s decision may be seen.  
This should relate to how the decision is viewed by Kiki, but also 
colleagues, organisations and the wider public.  This latter stage is 
hoped to encourage clinicians to step back and consider how their 
decision and motives may be interpreted, with an awareness that 
potential interpretations may influence their decision making.  Taking 
this into account, the clinician should ask themselves if their actions 
are truly virtuous, and intended to benefit Kiki.  It is through this self-
reflection that one would hope to avoid a defensive psychiatry, where 
containment is selected as it ‘looks good’, and emphasises a duty to 
care and compassion whilst smiling in the face of on-looking 
regulatory bodies and public.  Whilst it may be appropriate to contain 
Kiki’s risk, it is important this is done to her benefit, considering the 
benefits versus the dangers on both a short-term and long-term 
basis.  Any care which is provided as it ‘looks good’ for the clinician, 
rather than from a genuine belief that it will benefit Kiki, is void of 
virtue. 
 
Furthermore, containment is easy compared to tolerating risk, and it 
is hoped that this model could reassure clinicians and provide a 
framework for helping justify more difficult decision making.  Whilst 
Kiki voices suicidal ideation, it may be felt that intervention would be 
detrimental for some of the reasons discussed.  Although the 
reasoning behind a decision should always be clearly communicated, 
there is the potential, particularly in patients with BPD known for 
misunderstanding motives, that this will be misinterpreted.  A 
clinician may decide to tolerate Kiki’s risk, only to have Kiki feel as if 
she is being neglected and that the clinician doesn’t care.  She may 
have family that also feel this way, and often to the layman, with no 
awareness of the person, pattern of behaviour or diagnostic 
understanding, it does initially appear this way.  There may also be 
anxiety regarding how a decision will be viewed by regulatory bodies, 
but the model could provide a framework for justification of action.  
In this way, the model not only provides a framework to help 
reassure decision makers of their motives and intentions, but also 
encourages them to clearly communicate and document throughout 
the decision making process. 
 
There are many potential outcomes for Kiki, and it is appreciated that 
this model cannot fully capture the dynamics of specific individuals, 
environments and circumstances, however, it can be a useful aid to 
decision making and crisis management. 
 
Discussion 
The care of an inpatient with BPD involves walking a tightrope 
between establishing conditions to make the patient safe, and 
avoiding the complete removal of their personal responsibility [23].  
This difficulty can be highlighted with reference to the NMC code, 
which states that nurses must “act without delay if...there is a risk to 
patient safety”, whilst also attempting to “reduce as far as possible 
any potential for harm associated with your practice” [25].  A 
distinction is needed between the long-term and acute risks of suicide 
as a precursor to the use of the action/consequences model, where a 
delicate balance needs to be struck between containment and 
tolerance of these risks.   
 
Acute risk is more likely to merit containment, and can be morally 
justified in terms of a duty to maintain imminent safety.  If acting on 
long-term risk, containment is a detrimental reinforcement of patient 
helplessness and over time will likely increase the acute risk.  Long-
term risk warrants an approach guided by tolerance, with beneficent 
consequences being a maintained autonomy and personal coping 
mechanisms.  However, should this tolerance foster a complacency of 
acute risks, the beneficence clearly transforms into a violation of non-
maleficence. 
 
Whilst the accountability of health professionals is necessary to 
promote excellence in care, their motivations should not be 
relentlessly questioned.  As professions made up of selfless soldiers 
who should all have an innate caring instinct, mental health 
professionals working with people diagnosed with BPD will have 
beneficent motives which can sometimes backfire into maleficent 
consequences.  Regardless of the views of moral merit being in duty, 
motive or consequence, ethical scrutiny first requires a knowledge of 
the person, and understanding of the fragility and patterns of 
behaviour of people with BPD, before discussions around beneficence 
and non-maleficence can yield results.  A simplified stand-off between 
act and omission is not helpful as sometimes in this patient group, 
paradoxically, the best intervention can be a well thought out, 
professionally justified and well-communicated non-intervention.  The 
communication and empathy in the clinician/patient interaction is 
paramount, with fruitful responses not a direct mirroring of the 
patients anxiety, but a contingent marked mirroring [27] which 
acknowledges the distress, without resorting to an anxious or 
panicked response, and carefully selects the intervention, or non-
intervention, to the patients benefit. 
 
Whilst this may be a conclusion which appears to lack a definitive 
finality, the essence and purpose of this paper is to highlight the 
ethical challenges which may initially lack transparency.   It is the 
responsibility of all health professionals to treat each person on an 
individual basis, whilst having an understanding of the diagnoses of 
people they treat, and from this point hold an awareness of the 
ethical duties, intentions and consequences of their actions.   
 
The action/consequences model captures the issues of beneficence 
and non-maleficence within the context of risk assessment, potential 
benefits, potential dangers, potential timescales and potential 
interpretation of motives.  It would be hoped that whilst it is not-
exhaustive of all potential challenges, that it can prove a useful tool 
in clinical decision making and risk assessment.  In using this model 
as a process, an essential element would be communicating the 
decision making process clearly to the patient, showing honesty 
around the thought processes, motives and justifications for any 
action.  Working with people diagnosed with BPD can be challenging, 
and the diversity of individuals makes any black and white approach 
an impossibility.  In assessment of risk and ethical deliberation, the 
conclusion will be grey, unique to every patient, every presentation 
and every clinician. 
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